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A B S T R A C T
Purpose: In low and middle-income countries, programs funded and implemented by international
donors frequently transition to local funding and management, yet such processes are rarely evaluated.
We reﬂect upon experience evaluating the transition of a large scale HIV/AIDS prevention program in
India, known as Avahan, in order to draw lessons about transition evaluation approaches and
implementation challenges.
Results: In terms of conceptualizing the transition theory, the evaluation team identiﬁed tensions
between the idea of institutionalizing key features of the Avahan program, and ensuring program
ﬂexibility to promote sustainability. The transition was planned in three rounds allowing for adaptations
to transition intervention and program design during the transition period. The assessment team found
it important to track these changes in order to understand which strategies and contextual features
supported transition. A mixed methods evaluation was employed, combining semi-structured surveys of
transitioning entities (conducted pre and post transition), with longitudinal case studies. Qualitative
data helped explain quantitative ﬁndings. Measures of transition readiness appeared robust, but we
were uncertain of the robustness of institutionalization measures. Finally, challenges to the
implementation of such an evaluation are discussed.
Conclusions: Given the scarceness of transition evaluations, the lessons from this evaluation may have
widespread relevance.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Efforts to address the global HIV/AIDS epidemic and attain the
health-related Millennium Development Goals resulted in signiﬁ-
cant growth of investments in global health programs during the
2000s; however, this growth stagnated during the years following
the 2008 recession (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation,
2013). Further, growing interest in principles of good developmentAbbreviations: AIDS, Acquired Immune Deﬁciency Syndrome; BMGF, Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation; CMIS, Computerized Management Information System;
HIV, Human Immunodeﬁciency Virus; HRG, High Risk Group; MSM, Men who have
sex with men; NACO, National AIDS Control Organization; NACP, National AIDS
Control Program; NGO, non-government organization; SACS, State AIDS Control
Society; TI, targeted intervention.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 410 614 5137.
E-mail address: sbennett@jhu.edu (S. Bennett).
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4.0/).assistance practice as reﬂected in the Paris Declaration (OECD,
2005), have motivated calls for stronger country ownership and
capacity building from many high-impact donors (UNAIDS, 2012).
Together, these factors create a context in which international
development assistance partners are increasingly seeking to
transition ﬁnancing and management of global health programs
to local partners (Brundage, 2011; Saxenian et al., 2014). For
example, the current President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) ﬁve year strategy has as its ﬁrst goal ‘‘transition from an
emergency response to promotion of sustainable country pro-
grams’’ (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, 2009).
We deﬁne transition as the formal handing over of a donor
funded health program to one or more local partners in a fashion
that seeks to ensure that key elements of the program are
sustained over time. Given how central the notion of transition is
to sustainability and long-term effects of the entire development
enterprise, there is a surprisingly modest literature and relativelye under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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transition practice. Much of the growing literature on sustainabili-
ty evaluation (Scheirer, 2005, 2013; Scheirer & Dearing, 2011;
Wiltsey Stirman et al., 2012) focuses on high-income countries, is
typically concerned with relatively small-scale programs, and
involves cessation of support for a program rather than transition
of the program to another funder or entity. Nonetheless, even in
these settings issues concerning the identiﬁcation of new funding
sources are often critical. A recent review of the peer-reviewed
literature in this ﬁeld found that most evaluations were retrospec-
tive, few used independent evaluators and methodological rigor
was weak (Wiltsey Stirman et al., 2012). Evaluations of transition
with an identiﬁed receiving partner are rare, and occur typically in
the context of transferring a community initiative to community
owners (Hacker et al., 2012; Rissel, Finnegan, & Bracht, 1995).
Transitions of large-scale health initiatives to country govern-
ments are relatively novel in global health practice. While other
studies, including a handful of papers from the gray literature, have
retrospectively assessed donor exit (Amaya, Caceres, Spicer, &
Balabanova, 2014; Bossert, 1990; Rogers & Macias, 2004; Slob &
Jerve, 2008), we are aware of no other efforts to monitor and
prospectively evaluate the transition of a large-scale health
program into a government health system.
This paper discusses approaches to monitoring and evaluat-
ing (M&E) transition and sustainability of donor programs. In
particular, we draw upon our own experience of M&E of the
transition of a large HIV/AIDS prevention program in India,
known as Avahan, the India AIDS Initiative. This paper addresses
both methodological and practical issues that arose in the
Avahan transition evaluation, but does not present ﬁndings from
the evaluation which are published elsewhere (Bennett et al.,
2015; Rodriguez et al., forthcoming). The Avahan transition
evaluation was conducted by a disciplinarily diverse team
including both US-based and India-based researchers. This paper
draws upon discussions of the team, both through routine
teleconferences and meetings over the life of the evaluation
(2009–2013) as well as a retreat held in August 2013. Our
interest in transition M&E is based upon the belief that, if well
designed and implemented, transition monitoring can provide
early warning to stakeholders of problems in the transition
process that need to be addressed and, over the longer term,
evaluation can reassure both development partners and
governments that the effects of initial investments have been
sustained.
The paper proceeds by providing a brief overview of the Avahan
transition and the evaluation design. We then discuss four main
challenges related to M&E of transition, namely:
i. Seeking conceptual clarity
ii. Accommodating adaptation
iii. Identifying and interpreting measures and indicators
iv. Addressing practical challenges in implementation.
We conclude by discussing implications for other evaluations of
program transition.
2. An overview of the Avahan transition and transition
evaluation design
Avahan was initiated in 2003 when projections for the growth
of HIV/AIDS in India painted a worrying picture of the potential
impact of the epidemic (Chandrasekaran, Dallabetta, Loo, Rao, &
Gayle, 2006). From 1992 to 2006 during its ﬁrst two national
AIDS control programs, the Government of India (GOI) had
recognized the potential impact of HIV and began to implement
prevention and control activities for both at risk groups and thegeneral population. However there was a sense that scale up was
not proceeding fast enough. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
(BMGF) stepped into this space and, building on prior Indian
experience, sought to use evidence to reﬁne the program design,
and develop a package of interventions targeted at most at risk
populations that could be rapidly scaled up (Claeson & Alexander,
2008).
Under Avahan funds ﬂowed from the BMGF India ofﬁce to State
Lead Partners (typically international or large national NGOs) that
bore responsibility for Avahan-supported HIV/AIDS prevention
services within that state. These NGOs in turn sub-contracted
smaller, local NGOs to provide a range of prevention services
(Sgaier et al., 2013). Services provided included peer education,
condom distribution, testing and treatment of sexually transmit-
ted infections, clinical service referral, community mobilization, as
well as structural interventions aimed at reducing stigma, violence,
and barriers to accessing entitlements (The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, 2008). Local NGOs typically provided this entire
package of services to their catchment population, centering their
services around a ‘‘drop-in’’ center. Avahan was focused in four
states in Southern India (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra,
and Tamil Nadu) and two states in North-Eastern India (Manipur
and Nagaland) where the HIV epidemic was the greatest and along
the national highways. During the period June 2004 through to
December 2007 Avahan achieved rapid scale up, for example
increasing the number of peer educators providing services from
240 to 7500, and the number of people in high risks groups covered
by the intervention from 22,000 to 280,000, or about 83% of the
enumerated target population (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
2008a). It should be noted that while Avahan worked across six
states, it was not the only provider in these states, with the GOI and
some other donors, also providing HIV prevention services.
From relatively early in the life of the initiative, it was planned
that the program eventually be transitioned with responsibility for
funding and implementation being taken over by the Indian
government and other local owners. The ﬁrst formal transition
plan was developed in 2008 (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
2008b), but this initial blue print continuously evolved throughout
the transition period based on the experience of transitioning. Two
Memoranda of Cooperation that documented key aspects of
transition were signed between the federal government and BMGF
in 2006 (Government of India, 2006) and a more detailed version in
2009 (Government of India, 2009). It is important context that in
the period 2004–2009 the Avahan program had worked exten-
sively to shape the National AIDS Control Program III (NACP III)
(National AIDS Control Organisation, 2006), and had been
particularly effective in shaping implementation protocols for
the program (Tran, Bennett, Rituparna, & Singh, 2013). Thus by
2009 there were many similarities between the government and
Avahan programs.
This evaluation focused on the transition of NGOs providing
services to most at risk populations, namely female sex workers,
MSM, transgenders, and persons who inject drugs. By 2009 there
were 144 Avahan service sites in South India, run by local NGOs
and each offering a full array of services to their target populations.
The transition of these NGOs was planned to occur in three
tranches, with 10% transitioning in 2009, 20% in 2011 and 70% in
2012. This phased transition was planned so that there would be
sufﬁcient opportunity to integrate learning from each tranche into
subsequent tranches. It was agreed between BMGF and the GOI
that through the transition process government, via the State AIDS
Control Societies, would take over the funding of the NGOs
formerly supported by Avahan. These NGOs would continue to
offer more or less the same bundle of services to their target
populations. Multiple speciﬁc accommodations to programming
were required. For example, GOI funding levels were lower than
S. Bennett et al. / Evaluation and Program Planning 52 (2015) 148–158150those provided for by Avahan, which necessitated changes in
stafﬁng levels, salaries and services offered. Also NGOs were to
refer clients to government health services rather than contract
health care provider to come to their drop-in centers, and
commodities were to be procured through government systems,
rather than through Avahan.
The transition evaluation, commissioned by BMGF in 2009,
was conducted by external independent evaluators and was
intended to (i) provide timely information for stakeholders
in the Avahan transition, (ii) provide an independent assessment
of how successful transition had been, and (iii) contribute to
global learning about effective strategies to transition donor
programs.
A logic model was developed to guide the evaluation design
(Fig. 1) (Bennett, Singh, Ozawa, Tran, & Kang, 2011). It identiﬁed a
set of activities that helped prepare NGOs for transition,
including (i) capacity development for government (at all
levels including the National AIDS Control Organization, State
AIDS Control Societies and districts), NGOs and most at risk
populations, (ii) the alignment of Avahan interventions under
the Avahan program with government norms, standards and
budgets, and (iii) ensuring ongoing government commitment to
the transition, particularly at the national level, but also locally. It
was proposed that successful implementation of such activities
would in turn prepare NGOs for transition, and after transition,
such preparation would contribute to the effective institutional-
ization of key practices within the national Indian AIDS control
program. By institutionalization we mean the integration of
program management practices into organizational procedures
post-transition so that they are sustained (Pluye, Potvin, & Denis,
2004). This entire process was envisaged to result in a sustained
HIV response.
The evaluation included ﬁve different components (work
packages) to be implemented by the independent evaluation
team, as well as other data sources to be drawn upon (Table 1).
While the original plan was to work in all six states where Avahan
was present, the assessment was only carried out in the four
southern states. Transition plans for the two North-Eastern states
were delayed several times, and when transition ﬁnally occurred it
did so quite rapidly in 2012–2013 with insufﬁcient time for the
evaluation team to conduct the evaluation.Fig. 1. Initial logic model3. Findings
3.1. Seeking conceptual clarity
The transition model used by the BMGF in 2009 emphasized the
importance of a smooth transition process, but it became apparent
that sustaining services, and hence outcomes, post-transition was
viewed to be the key goal. Our logic model and evaluation design
sought to capture both dimensions: the smoothness of the process
of transition and the sustainability of services. However, it is not
clear that a smooth transition will necessarily help to sustain pre-
transition outcomes; and conversely, a cumbersome and disrup-
tive transition might nonetheless sustain outcomes over time. For
example, many of the NGOs that transitioned during the ﬁrst
transition round had a difﬁcult transition process, with extended
gaps in the ﬂow of funding and supplies, however the fact that
these NGOs had been selected because they were relatively higher
capacity meant that typically, in the medium term, they were able
to recover from this temporary set back.
Our original conceptual model for the evaluation suggested that
strong transition planning and preparedness translates into
sustained service outcomes. Drawing upon the innovation
literature, we proposed that transitioning a program from a donor
to government was akin to implementing an innovation within the
Indian health system, and that this innovation needed to be
routinized and institutionalized within the government system for
the program, and program outcomes, to be sustained (Scheirer,
2005; Yin, 1981). Further, we conceptualized this process of
institutionalization to involve the integration of key practices of
the Avahan program into the organizational procedures and
behaviors of government agencies (Pluye et al., 2004).
Reﬂecting this understanding, the institutionalization assess-
ment that we developed measured the extent to which key Avahan
practices (such as the use of data to monitor program progress),
persisted post-transition, and thus contributed to sustained
service outcomes. However, during the evaluation, we recognized
the tension between alignment with government norms, stan-
dards, and budgets on the one hand and institutionalization of key
Avahan practices on the other. For example, our logic model
suggested that in order to be well prepared for transition, Avahan
NGOs must align their operating processes with government guiding evaluation.
Table 1
Summary description of work packages in the evaluation, and status at the end of the evaluation.
Work package Description Status
1. Government capacity
assessment
Intended to assess the effects of Avahan support to the
capacity of government (at multiple levels) to exercise its
stewardship role related to HIV/AIDS prevention including
for example, staff availability, training, existence of norms,
etc.
One small component of this work was completed in 2010 but
never ﬁnalized. The rest of the work package was not
implemented, due mainly to sensitivities on the part of the
government of India.
2. Transition readiness A largely quantitative assessment at the level of the
individual NGO regarding its readiness to transition in
terms of (i) capacity, (ii) communication and (iii) alignment
This was implemented for all Round 2 (2011) NGOs (n = 27)
and for a sample of Round 3 NGOs (n = 53) as originally
planned.
3. Longitudinal case studies A series of largely qualitative case studies of NGOs
conducted shortly after transition designed to cast light on
the nature of transition and the early effects of transition,
with follow-up visits to a sub-sample of NGOs. Interviews
were to be carried out with state, NGO and key population
actors.
This was the only aspect of the assessment that was
conducted for Round 1 NGOs (that transitioned in 2009)
(n = 5). It was also conducted for Rounds 2 and 3 (n = 5 and
n = 6, respectively) and revisits were made to four NGOs (2
from 2009, 2 from 2011). Sample selection was based in part
on the ﬁndings of the transition readiness survey in order to
ensure maximum variability. Due to delays in gaining access
to NGOs, data collection often took place 8–10 months post-
transition, which was later than intended.
4. Institutionalization survey All of the NGOs included in the transition readiness survey
were to be revisited approximately 1 year after the
transition took place to assess the extent to which (i) key
Avahan practices persisted after transition and (ii) key
services had been maintained.
This was implemented more or less as planned. The biggest
challenge faced was that several service packages run by
NGOs split up, discontinued or merged with others at the time
of transition and therefore there was not a perfect match
between the transition readiness and the institutionalization
survey and led to some delays (data collected 12–18 months
post transition). 2011 cohort n = 28; 2012 cohort n = 42.
5. Summative evaluation This ﬁnal piece was intended to synthesize ﬁndings from all
other components of the study along with other available
data (see below)
Completed
Additional components carried
out separately by other teams
1. Assessment of mobilization
of key populations
A separate organization had been tasked with assessing the
strength of mobilization of key populations and readiness
for transition. We planned to draw upon this work,
although the longitudinal case studies also captured
community perspectives.
While this work has gone ahead, the data from the
assessments have never been made public (or made available
to this assessment team) largely due to concerns about the
conﬁdentiality of the key populations concerned.
2. Routine management
information data
Routine data from Avahan prior to transition and from
India’s National AIDS Control Organization after transition
were to be used to assess overall trends in HIV/AIDS
services and thus better situate Avahan NGOs that had
transitioned. Further it was intended to use CMIS data to
assess service coverage.
CMIS data was requested from NACO but was not made
available. Instead, routine service coverage data were
collected directly from individual NGOs (as part of work
packages 2 and 4) and this has been the sole service coverage
data available for analysis.
Unanticipated additional elements
1. Documentation of transition
preparation activities and how
they varied between rounds
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key Avahan
staff to document lessons learned between each round, and
adaptations made to the transition preparedness strategy.
This was supplemented by review of documents concerning
transition planning.
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adopting government procurement systems and transiting clinical
services into government facilities. In reality, such alignment
measures were sometimes incompatible with the institutionaliza-
tion of key Avahan practices post-transition.
The very concept of institutionalization suggests that program
practices that have worked well historically will continue to be
effective, even when implemented in a different organizational
environment. We found this notion questionable. For example, in
the second transition round, 75% of the NGO respondents (21 out
of 28) thought that supervision practices had changed post-
transition, but among them 90% perceived supervision to have
strengthened not weakened. They stated that they were now
getting more regular supervision from government, including
the use of video calls with their supervisors.
A second conceptual problem that the evaluation struggled
with concerned what was to be sustained. As Fig. 1 illustrates, we
initially conceptualized sustainability as ‘‘a sustained HIV re-
sponse’’, but HIV prevention services are not monolithic. As the
evaluation progressed it became apparent that some aspects
of HIV prevention services may be sustained or even enhancedpost-transition (e.g. integrated counseling and testing for HIV),
while others (e.g. measures to reduce violence targeted at High
Risk Groups) may deteriorate. With hindsight it would have been
useful to both the evaluation and program managers to have a
clearer understanding of which services were perceived to be most
critical to sustain post-transition.
3.2. Accommodating adaptation
As Avahan was transitioned over a period of 4 years, there were
multiple adaptations throughout the process that affected both the
transition design, and elements of Avahan which were institution-
alized.
First, because the transition occurred in three rounds and
allowed for feedback and adaptation to transition preparations, the
procedures used to prepare NGOs for transition changed over time.
For example, during transition Round 1 there was relatively little
preparation for transition, other than seeking to align the NGO’s
cost structures with government norms and providing training to
NGO staff on government procurement and management infor-
mation systems. For transition round 2, additional activities
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building up of buffer supplies to cover initial gaps in supply chain
after transition, as well as the negotiation of post-transition
support agreements. Between Rounds 2 and 3, a ‘‘common
minimum package’’ of transition activities and benchmarks was
developed to guide the process. This common minimum package
encompassed all of the activities described above as well detailed
planning, and orientation for all levels of staff and the most at risk
populations whom they served. The initial evaluation design had
not planned to systematically document the evolution and
learning that occurred in the transition process itself. However,
once the evaluation team became aware of these changes we
added a component of interviews with Avahan staff that reﬂected
on learnings from different rounds of transition, and how these
learnings had been integrated into transition preparedness
planning and activities.
Second, it became apparent that our logic model did not
adequately capture the inﬂuence of local context, and how this
interacted withthe transition. Signiﬁcantcontextual variations at the
state level included factors such as the capacity of government
organizations to administer programs, and the nature of relation-
ships between Avahan and government actors. For example, in
contextswheretherewere strong and trustingrelationships between
government and Avahan actors, transition processes tended to
be much smoother. Within NGOs, factors such as the prior experience
of the NGO in running government-funded programs and the
strength of its focus on community activism were important. NGOs
that had experience working for both Avahan and government were
morelikely toaccommodate transition processes easilybecause their
own norms and standards were already in line with the government.
While the longitudinal case studies alerted the evaluation team to
the importance of contextual factors, such features were not
systematically captured in other study components.
Finally, throughout the transition there was tension between
program ﬁdelity to government norms and efforts to alter those
norms. BMGF, the SLPs, and the NGOs all sought to inﬂuence
government norms and standards, or negotiate greater ﬂexibility
within these norms. This started prior to the formal transition
process with Avahan seeking to inﬂuence the norms and protocols
through which the third National AIDS Control Program (National
AIDS Control Organisation, 2006) was implemented, but persisted
throughout the transition process. For example, the State Lead
Partner in one state negotiated higher salaries for very experienced
NGO staff. In other states NGOs negotiated ﬂexibility in prescribed
ratios of peer educators to key populations so as to accommodate
differences in the density of target populations. Implementation
science acknowledges that blind ﬁdelity to the initial intervention
design may be counter-productive, and that adaptation is desirable
in order to accommodate differing contextual factors or learning
(Aarons et al., 2012; Bopp et al., 2013). This balance between
program adaptation and program ﬁdelity is highly relevant to
transition evaluations, and has practical implications for identify-
ing transition indicators (see below).
3.3. Identifying practical measures and indicators
The evaluation employed a mixed methods design (Table 1),
combining indicators of transition readiness, institutionalization
and service sustainability, with a series of qualitative longitudinal
case studies, intended to explain the observed phenomena.
Developing indicators of transition readiness and institutionaliza-
tion that could be tracked over time created signiﬁcant challenges,
both practical and conceptual.
Table 2 illustrates the indicators that were used to capture
transition readiness (measured just prior to transition). The
construct of transition readiness was broken down into threecomponents: capacity, communication and alignment. Capacity
indicators captured information about the organization and
functioning of the NGO. Communication indicators focused on
the extent to which information about the transition had been
shared with staff and whether they had the opportunity to
inﬂuence transition planning. Alignment addressed the extent to
which NGOs had adapted their operations to reﬂect government
norms and guidelines. We sought to combine quantitative data
based on interviews with NGO managers with data extracted from
NGO records, and where possible also sought qualitative explana-
tions from interviewees in the form of comments on different
indicators. Analysis typically categorized NGOs as low, medium or
high for transition readiness on each of the different indicators.
For transition readiness, given the relatively clear Indian
government operational norms and Avahan expectations regard-
ing communication and capacity, it was feasible to construct
speciﬁc and measurable indicators, although it should be noted
that the measures of capacity employed (see Table 2) did not
necessarily reﬂect broad organizational capacity but rather
particular capacities speciﬁed in government operating norms. It
was more challenging to ensure that these indicators were
discriminating: for some indicators, close to 100% of NGOs were
rated as high; this may not be a problem if indeed these NGOs were
well prepared for transition. Factor analysis of these transition
readiness indicators also conﬁrmed the hypothesized dimension-
ality of the construct, identifying scales related to capacity,
communication and alignment. The interpretation of indicators
was more problematic. As noted previously, sometimes NGOs failed
to align with government norms (and thus received a low score)
for good reason. For example, they may have negotiated exceptions
to norms or they had put alternative systems in place, such as the use
of buffer stocks to facilitate a gradual transition to government
supply systems. Complementary qualitative data were key to
explaining the trends observed in the quantitative data.
In order to develop a tool to measure institutionalization, we
used a Delphi study with Avahan staff to identify the most
distinctive and critical elements of Avahan practices that needed to
be institutionalized post-transition, in order to sustain high quality
services. This process led to the identiﬁcation of a number of
features such as active use of data; a ﬂexible management style
that responds to local needs; and on-time, adequate and
uninterrupted ﬂow of funds and commodities, among others
(Mabuchi, Singh, Bishnu, & Bennett, 2012). The institutionalization
survey tool (Table 3) asked how frequently each of these practices
were carried out, if there had been any change in them since
transition, and if so how. The institutionalization survey tool was
implemented approximately 12 months after transition in the
same sample of NGOs as the Transition Readiness survey. However,
our institutionalization measure did not appear to be a signiﬁcant
predictor of service sustainability, and nor was it statistically
associated with transition readiness. We remain uncertain
therefore as to whether this instrument appropriately captured
institutionalization.
Finally, we sought to collect historical trend data on services
(Table 4). While the routine management information data from
Avahan was made available to the team, it proved difﬁcult to get
commensurate data from government for the post-transition
period. Instead, we were forced to rely on service data collected at
each NGO through the institutionalization survey based on
Computerized Management Information Systems (CMIS) forms
reported to government. This had a few drawbacks. First the data
were often incomplete, and this limited the number of variables
that could be used in the analysis. Second, we had hoped to be able
to compare our sample of NGOs with the broader population of
NGOs providing HIV prevention services, but this was not feasible.
In addition, the indicators were often different between the
Table 2
Transition readiness measure and data sources.
Question Response choices Data source
Capacity
‘‘Does the NGO/CBO have a linkage with government
integrated counseling and testing centers (ICTC)?’’
No linkage established; Most cases are referred to government
services; most cases referred receive these services
Interview
‘‘Does the NGO/CBO have a linkage with ART centers?’’ No linkage established; Most cases are referred to government
services; most cases referred receive these services
Interview
‘‘Does the NGO/CBO have a linkage with TB screening
centers?’’
No linkage established; Most cases are referred to government
services; most cases referred receive these services
Interview
‘‘Has the NGO/CBO been able to form groups at the
community level?’’
Groups have not been formed; group formation in process;
groups have been formed
Interview
‘‘Have community members at the hotspots formed crisis
response committees?’’
No committees formed; Yes, but less than 30% of members meet
every month; Yes, and 30% or more members meet every month
Interview
‘‘What is the coverage of identiﬁed HRGs with regular
contact (two contacts each month)?’’
Some HRGs contacted in last month (<30%); Over 30%
contacted in last month (<60%); 60% or more contacted in the
last month [based on NACO norm]
Documentation review
‘‘What percentage of HRGs who are referred actually visit
the ICTC?’’
Poor coverage (<50%); Over 50% of HRGs referred actually visit
the ICTC (<100%); 100% of HRGs referred actually visit the ICTC
[based on NACO norm]
Documentation review
‘‘What is the coverage of syndromic management for HRGs
with STI?’’
Poor coverage (<50%); Over 50% of HRGs with STI syndromes
receive treatment (<100%); 100% of HRGs with STI syndromes
receive treatment [based on NACO norm]
Documentation Review
Alignment
‘‘Has there been any change in the NGO/CBO team
structure, and are you following the NACO/SACS
guidelines?’’
No change in team structure; Some changes were introduced;
Following NACO/SACS NGO structure
Interview
‘‘Has there been any change in the reporting format, and are
you sending any reports to SACS/District AIDS Control
Societies?’’
No change in reporting format; SACS formats discussed but not
all introduced; Following all SACS formats
Interview
‘‘What is the present ratio of peer educators to HRG?’’ Ratio was not previously measured; ratio is measured and
approaching that of SACS; Following the SACS ratio
Interview/Document review
‘‘What is the present ratio of outreach worker to HRG?’’ Ratio was not previously measured; ratio is measured and
approaching that of SACS; Following the SACS ratio
Interview/Document review
‘‘Is the NGO/CBO following the STI syndromic management
guideline of NACO?’’
Avahan guidelines are still in place; Some changes are made
according to NACO guidelines; Following STI syndromic
management guidelines of NACO
Interview
‘‘Does the NGO/CBO procure STI syndromic management
medicines as per NACO/SACS guidelines?’’
Avahan supply chain in still in place; Some changes are made;
STI medicines are procured as per NACO/SACS guidelines
Interview
‘‘Has there been any change in the condom procurement
process?’’
No change in condom procurement process; Some changes are
made in the condom procurement processes; All condom
procurement is done through channels suggested by SACS
Interview
‘‘Do all identiﬁed hotspots have condom outlets?’’ None; Some; All hotspots have condom outlets Interview
‘‘Has there been any change in the budget as per NACO/
SACS guidelines?’’
No change, still following Avahan budget; Some changes were
made to the budget; Following NACO/SACS budget guidelines
Interview
‘‘Has there been any change in the Avahan method of micro-
planning to map at-risk populations?’’
Avahan method of micro-planning is still in place; Some
changes are made to micro-planning; Micro-plan follows NACO
guidelines
Interview
Communication
‘‘Have the staff been informed about the transition?’’ Not informed; Has been discussed; Transition plans have been
developed with staff inputs
Interview
‘‘Have program coordinators/directors received training on
NGO guidelines for transition as recommended by SACS?
None; Training has been planned but has not yet taken place;
Training has been received
Interview
‘‘Have program coordinators/directors received training on
program management for transition as recommended by
SACS?
None; Training has been planned but has not yet taken place;
Training has been received
Interview
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trends before and after the transition. Finally, at the time of
transition, the target populations for several NGOs were changed
so as to align their operations better with government norms:
NGOs with small target populations were merged with others, and
NGOs with large target populations were split up so as to serve
smaller groups. In this case we had to take account of changes in
the target population of the NGO in order to make the data
comparable over time.
3.4. Addressing practical challenges in evaluation implementation
The BMGF India Ofﬁce commissioned the assessment and as
such formed the primary audience for the evaluation. Avahan,
however, had been implemented by the BMGF together with an
array of implementing partners at state and local levels who werealso involved in the transition process. The fact that the evaluation
was commissioned early on in the process of transition was very
helpful: it enabled a prospective study, and it also facilitated
feeding early evaluation ﬁndings into later transition rounds. The
assessment team planned to feed ﬁndings back between each
round of transition with a view to informing the next round of
transition. This worked well initially: feedback from the transi-
tion readiness studies (2011 cohort) and the case studies
(2009 cohort) was provided to Avahan and other national and
state level partners in Fall 2011. However, given the limited time
between Round 2 and Round 3, it was not possible to analyze
qualitative data from Round 2 of the transition in time to feed into
transition planning for Round 3.
There is evidence that presentations by the assessment team
helped to reinforce, and perhaps to shape, Avahan’s transition
strategy for future rounds. This was particularly the case where
Table 3
Institutionalization measures.
Components Frequency question: Response
categories: regularly,
sometimes, never
Change question: Response
categories: Yes, No; If Yes,
change for the better, worse,
made no difference, describe
Original statement of key
Avahan practices
(Mabuchi et al., 2012)
Challenges
Data use ‘‘Does your NGO/CBO actively
use data for program
planning?’’
‘‘Has the use of data for
planning changed due to
transition?’’
Active use of data at all levels
for planning and regular review
of program delivery
Potentially different
interpretations of ‘‘active use of
data’’; Difﬁcult to verify
response‘‘Does your NGO/CBO actively
use data to monitor progress in
the program?’’
‘‘Has the use of data to monitor
progress changed due to the
transition?’’
Micro-planning ‘‘Do peer outreach workers use
pictorial micro-planning to
facilitate their mapping of most
at risk populations?’’
‘‘Has the use of pictorial micro-
planning tool changed due to
the transition?’’
Pictorial micro-planning tool
for peer outreach workers
Micro-planning is not speciﬁc
to the Avahan program and was
introduced widely during NACP
III; Almost all NGOs noted using
micro-planning regularly
Supervision ‘‘During the past year has the
NGO/CBO received supervisory
visits from DAPCU or SACS or
TSU?’’
‘‘Has supervision of your work
changed due to the transition?’’
Extensive onsite supportive
supervision provided by
managers and technical area
specialists
Responses were very variable
responses regarding
supervision, with some NGOs
perceiving supervision to have
improved in frequency and
content, and the others the
opposite
‘‘Do you ﬁnd supervisory visits
to be a good opportunity for
you to discuss solutions to any
problems you may face?’’
Performance
monitoring
‘‘Is the performance of peer
outreach workers monitored
rigorously?’’
‘‘Has performance monitoring
of peer outreach workers
changed due to the transition?’’
Rigorous performance
monitoring of peer outreach
workers by staff supervisors
and community committee
Potentially different standards
for performance monitoring;
Causality is not clear
Flexible
management
‘‘Has SACS provided any
ﬂexibility on budget, based on
realities on-the-ground?’’
‘‘Do you ﬁnd that the SACS is as
ﬂexible in its management style
as the Avahan SLP?’’
Flexible management style that
facilitates response to local
needs
Causality is not clear
‘‘Does SACS allow any
exceptions to operating norms
(other than budget) such as the
PE/ORW ratio, based on
realities on-the-ground?’’
Common
Minimum
Program
‘‘Do the staff follow the clinic
operational guidelines and
treatment guidelines set by
NACO?’’
‘‘Has the clarityof guidelines on
clinical services changed due to
the transition?’’
‘‘Common Minimum Program’’
with Clinic Operational
Guidelines and Standards and
Treatment Guidelines to build a
shared vision and deﬁne
operating standards
Funds and
commodities
‘‘During the past year, have you
ever had any problem with cash
ﬂows from the SACS that has
affected your operations?’’
‘‘Has there been any change in
the amount of funds provided
to the NGO due to the
transition?’’
On-time, adequate and
uninterrupted ﬂow of funds
and commodities to the
grassroots level
Prior to the transition, all SLPs
disbursed funds every quarter
but SACS disburses funds twice
a year, so this shift needed to be
accounted for.‘‘Has there been any change
due to the transition, in funds
arriving on time at the NGO?’’
‘‘During the past year has your
NGO always had sufﬁcient
stock of commodities, such as
condoms or medicines?’’
‘‘Has there been any change in
the quantity of commodities
supplied to the NGO due to the
transition?’’
In general SACS provided fewer
condoms than under Avahan,
but still a sufﬁcient number.
‘‘Has there been any change in
the supply chain of
commodities to the NGO due to
the transition?’’
Advocacy ‘‘Do you ﬁnd that SACS/NACO
advocates on behalf of HRG
programs?’’
‘‘Has the relationship between
HRGs and local police changed
due to the transition?’’
Support to service delivery
through strong advocacy
programs at national and state
level
Respondents frequently cited
positive changes in
relationships with police but
did not attribute these to the
transition
‘‘Has the relationship between
HRGs and service providers
changed due to the transition?’’
Community
Activities
‘‘Do you ﬁnd that the crisis
response system works?’’
‘‘Has crisis response
management changed due to
the transition?’’
Community-led crisis response
management
Community groups
& organizations
‘‘Have you supported
community groups and
organizations?’’
‘‘Has the focus on supporting
community groups changed
due to the transition?’’
Strong focus on fostering
community groups and
organizations
Community
oversight
‘‘Does a committee of
community members oversee
the program?’’
‘‘Has there been a change, due
to the transition, in oversight of
the program by committees of
community members?’’
Committees of community
members that oversee the
program
‘‘During the past year, has the
committee of community
members made any
recommendations for program
change?’’
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Table 3 (Continued )
Components Frequency question: Response
categories: regularly,
sometimes, never
Change question: Response
categories: Yes, No; If Yes,
change for the better, worse,
made no difference, describe
Original statement of key
Avahan practices
(Mabuchi et al., 2012)
Challenges
Training for peer and
outreach workers
‘‘Are the training needs of PEs
and ORWs assessed?’’
‘‘Has training for PEs or ORWs
changed due to the transition?’’
Need based systematic training
to enhance peer outreach
workers’ skills and leadership‘‘Do PEs and ORWs receive
skills and leadership training
(beyond general orientation
training)?’’
Saturation Coverage ‘‘Do you plan for saturated
coverage of small pockets of
HRGs?’’
‘‘Has coverage of smaller
pockets of HRG changed due to
the transition?’’
Saturation coverage of even
smaller pockets of High Risk
Groups
Question failed to discriminate,
very large proportion of
respondents stated that they
always planned for saturated
coverage.
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own views. For example, it was apparent after the ﬁrst round of
transition that commitment to community mobilization waned
post-transition. Avahan ultimately extended the package of
support for community mobilization so as to continue post-
transition. The longitudinal case studies also revealed problems
that arose among the 2009 cohort due to government delays in
disbursing funds and medical supplies. During subsequent rounds,
Avahan built up buffers of stocks and ﬁnances. The transition
readiness survey highlighted the fact that affected communities
and peer educators in the 2011 cohort were relatively poorly
informed about transition, and this was also addressed in the
2012 transition round.
While presentations to Avahan at the national level were
relatively straightforward, presentations at the state level were
more complex. Findings needed to be shaped according to the roles
that different audiences played, and also re-packaged to ensure the
anonymity of respondents within states. This process was
therefore a very time consuming one. There was also, at least
initially, a degree of defensiveness if ﬁndings were perceived to
reﬂect negatively on state level actors.
The assessment team consulted with government, both at the
national level (National AIDS Control Organization) and at the state
level (State AIDS Control Societies) early on in the transition
process. Despite efforts on the part of Avahan and the assessment
team, it never proved possible to fully engage the National AIDS
Control Organization as a partner in the evaluation. At the state
level, the picture was more varied. Avahan was transitioning at
the same time as other programs including USAID HIV/AIDS
prevention programs. Government staff were somewhat puzzled
at the intensity of effort going into the Avahan evaluation versus
the monitoring of other transitioning programs. The limited
participation by government had several implications, including
difﬁculty in accessing routine data, sensitivities around particular
elements of the evaluation, and perhaps less ownership of ﬁndings
of the evaluation.
There were multiple ‘‘natural owners’’ of the transitioned
program, including government (at national, state and districtTable 4
Service coverage measures.
Components Description Data sources 
HRG Coverage ‘‘No. of new and repeat FSW &
MSM contacted by peer educators
(using counseling material)’’/
Target population
CMIS indicators/NGO protoc
documents
Condom
Distribution
‘‘Condom distribution for all
HRG: Distributed to HRG, FSW &
MSM total’’/Target population
CMIS indicators/NGO protoc
documentslevels), the NGOs responsible for providing services (who it was
envisaged would continue in this role post transition), and the
most at risk populations served. The Avahan approach to transition
emphasized capacity development among all three of these actors.
In our initial evaluation design, we planned to collect data on
capacity of government and NGOs, and draw upon a companion
study being conducted by another research team on capacity of the
most at risk populations. In practice this did not materialize as
planned. There were understandable sensitivities to the implica-
tions of a development partner assessing government capacity, and
this aspect of the evaluation did not proceed. In terms of the most
at risk populations component, we faced difﬁculties accessing the
data collected by the other study. Finally, our work on assessing
NGO capacity went ahead, but in some cases government
determined that the NGOs contracted by Avahan were too weak,
and chose instead to contract another NGO.
4. Discussion and conclusions
The Avahan transition assessment was relatively well
resourced. While its costs constituted a small proportion of the
total transition budget, the large scale of the Avahan program,
meant that the evaluation likely cost more than similar evaluations
might in other contexts. We ﬁrst reﬂect on changes that we would
make to the transition evaluation design given a similar budget
and scope based on our lessons learned, and then consider how we
would construct an evaluation on a smaller budget.
4.1. Revisions to the evaluation design
There were many things about the Avahan transition evaluation
that worked well, including the parallel mixed-method design,
whereby the qualitative case studies helped to explain ﬁndings
from the more quantitative surveys; the phased transition and
opportunities to learn between transition rounds; and the early
commissioning of the transition. Here we focus primarily on the
aspects of the evaluation that we would change next time round.Advantages Disadvantages
ol Captures % of HRGs reached by
peer educators per target
population per month
Some CMIS data were not ﬁlled
in; Target population was not
recorded in CMIS
ol Captures average number of
condoms per HRG per month
CMIS formats differ by state and
change over time; Target
population was not recorded in
CMIS
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conceptual model is needed to assess whether change is indicative
of an appropriate adaptive response or a lapse that may threaten
program impact. It is unlikely that all actors involved in the
transition process will agree on what the desired outcomes of
transition are, and thus adaptations to program design may be
difﬁcult to interpret. For example, in Avahan it seems that the most
at risk populations placed a high value on the social activities and
general health care services offered by NGOs, whereas government
actors valued such services less. Gathering stakeholders early in
the evaluation to discuss and negotiate desirable transition
outcomes could help harmonize objectives across stakeholders,
and enhanced clarity on transition aims would also support the
evaluation. During this evaluation, there were changes to the
transition strategy between rounds of transition. Evaluations of
future transitions need mechanisms to account for learning and
adaptation occurring in the transition process as well as the
program being transitioned.
Context was important in inﬂuencing the nature of transition,
and in particular relationships between actors within the state
played a key role. The evaluation literature, particularly realist
evaluation approaches (Pawson & Tilley, 1997), recognize the
importance of context. The evaluation team should have paid
greater attention to this at the outset. In transitions where there
are multiple different actors involved, it may be useful to explore
stakeholder mapping to identify relationships between different
actors and understand how they evolve during the transition
process.
While the transition readiness survey appeared to work
relatively well, we were concerned about the validity of our
institutionalization scale, particularly given its failure to predict
service sustainability. We believe that given the limited number
of prior attempts to measure institutionalization (Slaghuis,
Strating, Bal, & Nie boer, 2011), more conceptual and empirical
work is needed in order to develop improved measures of
institutionalization. A further problem with our evaluation design
was that we had no data on the extent to which key practices
(measured in the institutionalization scale) were pursued by the
NGOs prior to transition and instead relied on NGO managers
recall concerning changes in practices. It would be helpful to
assess the prevalence of key practices to be institutionalized both
pre and post transition.
The capacity assessment component of this study was not
pursued, but in light of relatively high Indian government capacity,
it did not appear to be critical. However, in many other contexts it
will be crucial to assess government capacity to take over the
program. This evaluation originally intended to assess (i) availability
of sufﬁcient, appropriately qualiﬁed, experienced and motivated
staff at all levels of the government HIV/AIDS system (ii) whether
training programs offered relevant, high quality training that
matched the needs of government staff involved in HIV/AIDS
prevention and (iii) the availability of appropriate job supports
(such as operational guidelines) for staff. However even this
formulation had been shaped by sensitivities. Stakeholders
expressed concern about differences in organizational culture
between Avahan programs and government programs, and how
this might affect transition. While we recognized the potential
signiﬁcance of organizational culture it would have been quite
difﬁcult to evaluate well (Weiner, Amick, & Lee, 2008).
4.2. Downsizing the evaluation
Even with a smaller budget, we feel that it is critical to employ a
mixed methods approach. In our evaluation, there were too
many unexpected or difﬁcult-to-explain phenomena, that a
purely quantitative approach would have led to us drawinginappropriate or limited conclusions from the evidence collected.
Overall we recommend focusing quantitative measures on a
smaller number of indicators, and collapsing the transition
readiness and institutionalization surveys into one instrument
that could be applied twice, pre and post transition. This
instrument would combine measures of transition readiness
(including indicators of capacity development, communication
and alignment), key practices that should be maintained post-
transition (comparable to the institutionalization indicators in
our evaluation), and service coverage.
Qualitative, explanatory research may be undertaken on a
relatively small scale, but it is important that it captures
experience in different settings, given the considerable diversity
of experience that we found across contexts. Ideally, it should also
track transition processes over time. Such qualitative research can
identify unanticipated effects and learning, help adapt indicators
to track emerging behaviors or effects, explain patterns in
indicators and explain how contextual factors affect transition
processes.
4.3. Lessons learned
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no other
prospective evaluations of the transition of public health
programs in low and middle-income countries. The complex
and large scale nature of the Avahan program, the extensive
planning that went into transition, as well as the willingness of
the GOI to take over the program all contribute to making the
Avahan transition quite distinct. However given the growing
interest in transition (Brundage, 2011; GAVI Alliance, 2009;
Institute of Medicine, 2013; Slob & Jerve, 2008), and the need to
maximize the prospects for health gains to be sustained post-
transition, the lessons from this evaluation may have widespread
relevance. We conclude by identifying seven key lessons from
Avahan that are likely to be of relevant to future evaluations of
this nature:
1. Commission the transition evaluation early so that there is
sufﬁcient time to plan an M&E strategy and collect trend data.
2. Encourage phased transition designs – that enable the use of
transition evaluation data for subsequent rounds. Note that if
periods between transition tranches are short, then it will be
difﬁcult to apply M&E ﬁndings, particularly from qualitative
data.
3. Gather stakeholders to discuss and negotiate transition outcomes –
Evaluation is made easier if there is a very clear agreement about
which practices need to continue post transition. Early explicit
discussion of transition outcomes could contribute to harmoni-
zation across stakeholders as well as a stronger evaluation
design.
4. Seek broad stakeholder buy-in to the assessment and conduct a
jointly commissioned evaluation, recognizing that multiple
different partners (notably development partner, government
and community) will all have a stake in transition and have
different things to learn from a transition assessment. This may
help minimize sensitivities and promote uptake of ﬁndings.
5. Combine qualitative and quantitative data in a mixed methods
approach. As transition readiness and sustainability are context
speciﬁc, there is a need both for quantitative indicators to assess
the overall picture but also some means to explain observed
trends.
6. Ensure access to data continues post-transition for a minimum of
one year. Evaluations of transition will be stronger when there is
historical trend data on operational processes and service
outcomes. Frequently, it is difﬁcult to compare like with like pre
S. Bennett et al. / Evaluation and Program Planning 52 (2015) 148–158 157and post transition. In addition, there may be disruption at the
time of transition that may be sorted out 12 months later.
7. Ensure that the evaluation can document changes in the transition
strategy – the transition strategy is likely to evolve over time;
anticipate and capture this evolution.
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